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No Smoking: Policy Diffusion and its Prevailing Factors
Abstract
Over the past few years, many states have taken steps to ban smoking in public areas. The process of
specific polices spreading across state lines is called policy diffusion. Statewide anti-indoor smoking
bans are utilized to demonstrate what the most prevailing factors in policy diffusion are. A two-step
approach to analysis is implemented, first looking only at simple policy adoption among the 50 states,
and secondly the rate at which the policy expands across the country. A strong presence of local
ordinances, nearby neighbors with statewide bans in effect, and a history of smoking preemption laws are
found to be the most statistically significant of a list of variables. Because diffusion of this policy is
entering its final stages, this research can be used as a reference for designing and implementing policy
diffusion studies in the future.
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NO SMOKING: POLICY DIFFUSION AND ITS PREVAILING FACTORS
Brad Gresik

Abstract· Over the past]eIV years, lIlany states have taken steps to ban sllloking in public areas. The process of
specific polices spreading across state lines is called poliry difjifSion. 5tateJvide anti-indoor sllloking bans are utilized to

demonstrate Ivhat the 1Il0st prevailingfactors ill poliry difjifSioll are. A hvo-step approach to analysis is implellleJIted,
first looking only at simple poliry adoption amongthe 50 states, and secondly the rate at lvNch the poliry expands
across the country. A strongpreseJIce oflocal ordinallces, nearby neighbors lvith statewide bans in effict, and a history of
smokingpreelllptioll laws are found to be the most statistically significant ofa list ofvaJiables. Because difjilsion ofthis
poliry is entering its final stages, this research can be used as a refirencefor designing and implementingpoliry difjilsioll
studies in the future.
INTRODUCTION
Good ideas simply do not materialize as law in every state. Instead, these ideas slowly spread
from state to state based on a variety of internal and external factors, a process called policy
diffusion.

170

The phenomenon of progressive ideas spreading due to specific circumstances has long

been debated by scholars, generally requiring a two-fold examination to understand a policy's
diffusion. First, one must compare the circumstances of states that have adopted or not adopted the
policy in question. Once that is established, it becomes necessary to examine why a policy diffused so
rapidly in some states and lagged in others. The aim of this research is to determine both of these
components in regard to Anti-Indoor Smoking Bans CAISBs).
AISBs are important to the study of policy diffusion because they can be broadly applied as
a model for the study as a whole. This is due to the pressure to pass an AISB coming from different
levels of federalism. In the past, the push has primarily been from local and state pressure, but as of
September2013, federal funding is now being put towards anti-smoking policies. AISBs also
represent a policy which is still diffusing. For example, Indiana passed a comprehensive AISB in July
. 71
of2012, a full 17 years after Utah pioneered the policy in 1995 ' AISBs also are important to
172
examine because they are "fact-based" rather than a "moral-based" policies.
For instance, a state
policymaker can look at same-sex marriage and be morally opposed to it, and in their mindset, have a
reasonable rationale for excluding that policy. Smoking leading to cancer, heart failure, and stroke is
something that is an accepted fact in the majority of U.S., which therefore represents an interesting
take on how a baseline policy can be diffused. Due to these factors, this research can be used as a
jumping off point for other studies in the future and as a point of comparison.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A compelling diffusion analogy once observed that "a sense of political 'Stockholm
Syndrome' exists, where a piece of radical legislation gets passed by the Swedes, then it's flown
directly to the U.S. and is passed into law in California. Then it's flown to Wisconsin. Then to New

170 Shipan

and Volden 2006

171 Americans For Non-Smokers' Rights 2013
172 Shipan and Volden 2006

RE S PUB Lie A 1�77
,, 73
York. By the time it gets to Mississippi, which is about four years later, it's a national birthright. 1
This idea of policy diffusion was fIrst widely made popular with Jack L. Walker Jr.'s 1969
groundbreaking work "The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States," which still stands
!74
as a cornerstone of diffusion research.
Walker proposed the idea that the country has several
competitive regional leaders that emulate each other so as not to appear left behind. Using dozens of
different cases, Walker classifIed states as leaders, pioneers, and followers, defIning their role in the
diffusion process while leaving many questions to future scholars. Some of these pivotal questions
include what actually makes a state more or less prone to new ideas, and what is the biggest
determinant of adoption probability.
Virginia Gray began to tackle this problem in the years following Walker's work and began
to better frame the question researchers need to examine. By looking at several different policies
across what V.O. Key called the "have�not spectrum" including education, welfare, and civil rights,
Gray determined that it is almost impossible to fInd a catch-all diffusion model that will inherently
help defIne all future studies. 1

75

Most importantly, she found that all examinations of policy passage

need to be observed as time�specifIc, noting that states can change dramatically in as little as a
decade. Also emphasized was the importance of differing levels of federalism, as policy diffusion
trends looked completely different in cases where, for example, federal influence was exerted rather
than just state and local influence. Finally noted was the importance of current political and
economic conditions of the state during the tirne of passage. For example, a unifIed legislature
combined with a strong current economy might provide incentive to pass a politically turbulent
policy where before it might have been overlooked.
In a direct response to Gray three years later, Robert Eyestone claimed that it would be
irrational to dismiss policy diffusion as a case�specifIc phenomenon and identifIed key trends that
drive policy diffusion. Most importantly, it was found that even when a multitude of different
policies were controlled for, several states were always leaders in early adoption. However, as
Eyestone notes, "Diffusion patterns may record the spread by necessity rather than the emulation of
virtue: leaders may lead because they are also the fIrst to suffer industrial growth which creates
demands for state policy responses.

,,!76

Eyestone summarizes that for policy diffusion to be truly

understood, it must be battered with a multitude of independent variables, as the interactions
between many allow the true result to reveal themselves. The main message is that for diffusion to be
understood, many different models with the same policy must be run. A method which can be

173 Shaw and Renner 2002
174 Jack L.Walker 1973
175 Grey 1973
176 Eyestone 1977
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inferred from these authors suggests examining both simple adoption of a policy and then going
back and surveying the rate at wltich that policy was adopted. Without both parts of the puzzle, the
full story remains obfuscated.
The next major contribution in policy diffusion theory came with Berry and Berry's 1990
diffusion analysis. By using the policy of state lottery adoptions, they determined that many previous
studies had completely ignored the impact of internal factors, such as state legislature and local
municipality makeup, and external factors, such as the number of nearby state powers with similar
policies. The usage of a less controversial topic like lotteries as opposed to something more heated
like gun control also provided future scholars the ability to look at these two different categories as
separate beasts. In a nutshell, Berry and Berry proved to be groundbreaking due to the fact that they
had concrete proof of three principles: "the probability of state innovation is direcdy related to the
motivation to innovate, inversely related to the strength of obstacles, and direcdy related to the
availability of resources for overcoming these obstacles."

m

This not only confIrms that both Virginia

and Gray were correct in their papers, but also gave more context to Walker's fIrst proposal. Due to
the establishment of defInite diffusion facts, Berry and Berry'S article is easily one of the most cited
research endeavors in the fIeld of policy diffusion.
While the evaluation of macro-influences were being gauged and discussed, several scholars
such as John Kingdon and Michael Mintrom took a micro-approach to policy diffusion via the
importance of policy entrepreneurs. Policy entrepreneurs can be defIned as "people who seek to
initiate dynamic policy change.

,,178

In layman's terms, this comes down to individual politicians,

grassroots organizations, and lobbying institutions. Both Kingdon and Mintrom arrive at the
conclusion that policy diffusion absolutely ltinges on the success or failure of these groups in making
l79
their case to legislatures and the public.
Even when controlled across several policies and time, it
was found that effectiveness of policy innovators is statistically signifIcant. Ignoring them would
deprive a study of getting the full scope of what is occurring during the moment of policy
diffusion.

ISO

One interesting method that had not been considered was the notion of examining polices
that do not get adopted and comparing them to those which do. Craig Volden took tltis approach,
and his fIndings were quite strong in reaffIrming many central tenets of policy diffusion. Firsdy, he
noted that polices that do gain national and regional momentum usually have a watershed moment,
during wltich they gain traction and are adopted by many states in a very short period of time. Those

177 Berry and Berry
178 Kingdon 1984
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that do not typically have a very slow start and tend to lead nowhere. When looking at children's
health insurance programs, Volden also found that while diffusion does typically occur regionally
with leaders taking the initiatives fIrst, diffusion occurs most rapidly between states that are located
geographically close while simultaneously having a similar economic and political makeup.

IS!

The most relevant literature in regard to this research paper comes from Shipan and Volden
in 2006.

182

They were the fIrst to attempt to solely look at AISBs and attempt to explain their

diffusion across state lines. This work is signifIcant as it identifIes what makes up an AISB and labels
smoking as a fact-based policy. They also utilized the idea of the watershed moment and were able to
successfully create a working model of policy diffusion incorporating many of the lessons learned by
earlier diffusion scholars. These lessons include incorporating regional importance, policy
entrepreneurs, and several unique models. However, their models missed several key variables, such
as constituent makeup, and they exanrined the policy when it was still very young. To put in
perspective, over 20 states have adopted AISBs since 2006, which indicates that the study completely
missed the rapid watershed phase; in fact, it had only just begun.1

83

HYPOTHESES
My hypotheses for this project reflect the two-stage design explained in the literature review.
My fIrst hypothesis examines strictly policy adoption. The second looks at those states that as of
October 2013 already have policies in place, and assesses the rate in which the policies were passed.
Hi: Having a signifIcant percentage of the population already covered by AISB local ordinances will

lead to a state adopting a comprehensive AISB.
H2a: Geographical closeness to leader states will be the leading cause the rate of AISB to increase.
H2b: Internal state features will be the leading cause of AISB adoptions.

METHODOLGY
This research is based on a combination and adaption of the tests administered by Shipan and
Volden (2006) as well as Berry and Berry (1990). I will examine all 50 states and their adoption of
AISBs between 1995- September 2013. The fIrst module will be a simple Pearson's r to determine if
there is any connection at all between the two dependent variables that will be tested, policy adoption
and rate of adoption. Next a binary logistic regression will be implemented with policy adoption as
the dependent variable. These results will then be compared with the fmal module, which is an
ordinary least squares regression with the rate. I observe rate of adoption in terms of simple years
and do not utilize months, so a policy passed in November 2008 and December of that same year

will receive the same score of 13 years.

18 1 Volden 2006
182 Shipan and Volden 2006
183 Ibid.
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RESEARCH DESIGN
As stated earlier, this research relies on two different dependent variables and the evaluation
of both of them to get the full picture of policy diffusion. My fIrst of these variables, Policy
Adoption, is simply a dummy variable which assigns a 1 to states which have a statewide
comprehensive AISB. Given consideration to the literature and how similar policies can carry the
same theme, a state will be evaluated to have an AISB if they have 2/3 of the parts necessary to have
what is considered a comprehensive smoke-free state: 100 percent smoke-free non-hospitality
184
workplaces, 100 percent smoke-free restaurants, and/or 100 percent smoke-free bars • My second
dependent variable is named Rate of Adoption. The rate of adoption is the number of years that have
!85
passed since the fIrst statewide AISB took place in 1995.
I am counting the years since the fIrst
case, not months. Due to the serious chance of data overlap and inconsistency with several other
independent variables that rely on the date being accurate, I believe simpler is better in this case and
paints a more accurate picture.
One of the most critical intervening variables being analyzed is one which captures the
pressure of local laws and ordinances. Retrieving these data was an arduous task, and was drawn by
adding up the overall percentage of a state's population already covered by local AISBs in place the
day that the statewide comprehensive AISB took effect. A chronological table of state and local
AISB laws

!86

along with a percentage chart of U.S. population covered by 100 percent Smoke-Free

laws were examined, which allowed a Proportion of State Population with Local Restrictions variable
to be generated.

!87

By using multiple data sources, I was able to avoid double counting data for cases

that might have overlapped (like Sacramento versus Sacramento County laws). If a state does not
have an AISB in place, I used the percentage as of October 2013.
The proximity variables were measured by breaking the concept into two parts to capture
the idea of geographical pressure influencing policy diffusion. First, I looked at regional adoption. I
did this by dividing the country into

4 semi-homogeneous partitions based off the Census Bureau's

regional map. The regions used are West (including Hawaii and Alaska), Midwest, South, and
Northeast. I then counted the number of states in that given region that had an AISB in place when
the state being examined passed theirs and divide by the total of regional states minus one to account
for the state itself. This culminates to the production of a Regional Adoption variable. For example,
Florida would receive a .083 because 1/12 of the other southern states already had a comprehensive
AISB in place. I implement a similar scheme for the Bordering State Adoption variable as similarly

184 Americans For Non-S mokers' Rights 2013
185 Ibid.
186 Americans For Non-S mokers' Rights 2013
187 Ibid.
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implemented by Shipan and Volden (2006).1

A state receives this score based on the percentage of

states that share any direct border with the state being examined. This information was collected
from the Americans for Non-Smokers' Rights interest group.
To capture internal state governance similarities, I use a variety of variables. First, I
implement the Legislative Professionalism variable, and use the Squire scale and direcdy place every
state's 2003 legislative professionalism score into SPSS. Legislative professionalism scores are based
on a variety of things, such as how many days the general assembly is in session. The result of this
process is states like California, whose state legislature essentially prepares policymakers for the
national political scene, receive a higher score than places like Idaho, where the legislature is very
speed orientated and lawmakers are more lax. Next I use the Congressional Quarterly Political
Encyclopedia of U.S. States and Regions to look at my Democrat and Republican Unity dummy
variable. For a state to score a 1, the year their AISB was passed both upper and lower house along
with the governor must be from the same party.

ISO

If the state has not passed an AISB, I use October

2013 as the date to record. I also use a dummy variable I call Historical Preemption, again drawing
from the Americans for Non-Smokers' Rights database and give a state a 1 if they have had any kind
of AISB preemption law since 1995, when the fIrst statewide ban took effect until October 2013, the
cutoff date for my model. Finally, I used the variable Government Ideology to capture government
preferences, as opposed to constituent ones, because "all else equal, a more liberal government
,,190
prefers a higher level of government activism.
I use the historical state score from Berry et al.

(2010) to determine the fIgure and use the date of when a state passed an AISB. For those states that
passed statewide AISBs after 2010, I referred to Richard C. Fording's database, which has the
updated fIgures until October 2013. For those states who do not have a statewide AISB, I used the
l91
October 2013 score.
I then turn my attention to the people that comprise the state, and insert several variables
based on their traits. I use Berry et al.'s citizen ideology score to represent the constituents in a
state

ln

I direcdy place this score (from dle year the AISB was placed or October 2013 if none) into

SPSS and named it Citizen Ideology. I also examine historical median income from the US Census
Bureau and use a similar measure of entry into SPPS, again using the dates an AISB was in place (or
l93
October 2013 if none) I call this variable Median Income.

188 Shipan and Volden 2006
189 Winkler 2008

190 Volden 2006
191 Fording 2013
192 Berry andBerry 1990
193 US CensusBureau 2013
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Tobacco usage and production must also be considered when looking at anything related to
anti-smoking. I used historical smoking rates from when a state passed an AISB or 2013 if AISBs
were not present. I obtained this information from the American Lung Association. I named the
created variable Smoker Percentage. To capture the idea of a tobacco producing state and the
ramifications, I use a dummy variable called Tobacco Producing State, and give a 1 to those states
which grow or produce tobacco products and 0 to those who do not.
Finally I construct two opposite variables which examine lobbyist influence in a state and
name them Tobacco 1.JJbby Percentage and Health 1.JJbby Percentage. The figures are taken from a 1996
snapshot study conducted by Goldstein and Bearman. The measure is "a ratio of the number of
,
health (or tobacco) lobbyists in the state to the total number of registered lobbyists present. ,194
Together I believe these variables accurately reflect the many scholars who wrote diffusion literature
recommend as a "comprehensive analysis of policy diffusion," and truly capture the whole picture of
what is happening in statewide comprehensive anti-indoor smoking bans.
RESULTS
Table 1:

Pearson's r correlation

Policy
Policy & Median income (-.369**)
Policy & South (-.646**)
Policy & Citizen ID (.564**)
Policy & T. Producing State (-.305*)
Policy & Percent Smokers (-.444*)

Years

Years & Percent Region (.689**)
Years & Percent Touch (.439**)
Years & Uni. Republicans (-.351*)
Years & Percent Smokers (.632**)
**-.05 *-.01

Table 1 is the statistically significant Pearson's r correlations between the two dependent
variables in the equation. Between both simple policy adoption and adoption rate, the only common
correlation between the two was Percent Smokers. It has a negative correlation at -.444 and was
statistically significant at the .05 level for policy adoption, meaning more smokers will lead to less of a
chance for an AISB to be in place in that state. For adoption rate, Percent Smokers had a positive
correlation of .632 and was actually significant at the .01 level. Other statistically significant adoption
rate correlations included median income, south, citizen ideology, and if the state is a tobacco
producing one. Adoption rate correlations appeared to be based along geographical lines, with both
my proximity variables of regional adoption and direct border state adoption variables were
statistically significant at the .01 level. To no one's surprise, there was a negative correlation between
unified republicans and the adoption rate of AISBs. Most notably absent from both policy and years
were the variables Unified Democrats and Government Ideology, which in this early test might signal
that in this particular policy, constituent makeup matters more than governmental.

194 Goldstein

and Bearman 1996
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Table 2:

Binary logistic regression of simple policy adoption

Model

Exp(B)

Sig.

Constant

.009

.25

Municipality

.928

.049*

Professionalism

1.03

.679

Unified Republicans

.102

.234

Unified Democrats

6.85

.293

Citizen Ideology

1.215

.015*

Government Ideology

.938

.110

Tobacco Producer

.90

.066

Preemption History

1.470

.836

Median Income

1.056

.593

R2

-

.735

Table 2 represents my first stage of policy diffusion. The dependent variable in this binary
logistic regression was whether or not a state simply had a comprehensive AISB or not. The R2 was
.735, which allows us to say that the model explains 73.5 percent of the variance in the dependent
variable. Of the variables listed above, only the percentage of state covered by local ordinances and
citizen ideology were statistically significant at the .05 level (.049 and .015 respectively).
Professionalism, unified democrats and republicans, government ideology, if the state was a
tobacco producer, preemption of AISBs, and median income were all statistically insignificant. These
initial findings appear to be in line with what other researchers have found to be primary
determinants of policy diffusion but with several key exceptions. All of the factors which represent
state-level influences, such as government ideology and unified legislatures played zero role in
determining the passage of a statewide AISB. The influence of municipality passage also appears to
have diminished since Shipan and Volden's similar endeavor in 2006, which across the board found
.01 significance level, most notably with local ordinances.

841RES
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OLS regresslOn 0f: polic adoptlon rates.

Tahie 3:

T-Score

Sig.

Constant

.992

.333

Municipality

1.072

.296

Percent Region

2.372

.028*

Percent Touching

.377

.71

Professionalism

-1.904

.071

Median Income

-.344

.735

Unified Republican

-.643

.527

Unified Democrat

1.016

.322

South

1.687

.107

Preemption

-2.12

.047*

Citizen Ideology

-.207

.838

Government Ideology

-.274

.787

Tobacco Producer

.864

.398

Percentage Smokers

.869

.395

Tobacco Lobby

-.51

.615

Health Lobby

1.711

.100

Model

R2

-

.765

Std. Error of the Ewmate

-

2.165

Table 3 is the second step in analyzing policy diffusion, this time using rate of adoption with
those states which have an AISB in place as the dependent variable. To calculate this, a filter was
implemented to only look at states that registered policy = 1 on SPSS, resulting in an N of 36. Again,
a high R2 was observed, specifically .765, which gives a high amount of confidence. Surprisingly, this
time the percentage of citizens with a local ordinance and citizen ideology were not statistically
significant. This time municipality had a causal effect of .296 and citizen ideology was observed at
.838. What was statistically significant, however, was the percentage of states already with an AISB in
place when the case state adopted, along with a negative correlation with states that have had a
history of AISB preemption laws in place. Again, unified Democrats and Republicans did not come
up as statistically significant and were observed at .322 and .527 respectively. Surprisingly, the
variables for Tobacco and Health Lobby both were not statistically significant, with the former
coming in at .615 and the latter at .102. Percentage smokers and tobacco being produced in a state
both were also statistically insignificant despite the percentage of state smokers being so strongly
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related in the last model that it had to be removed. The percentage of smokers in a state was only

.395

and production was

.615.

During this step of the evaluation of AISBs, regionalism percentage

and history of preemption laws were statistically sigoificant at the
and preemption

.047. Although

.05

level, with regionalism at

.028

the regionalism score was sigoificant, the bordering score was not.

This is noteworthy because it implies that the defmition of state neighbors must be expanded to
include more than those states which share a direct border.
Figure 1: A frequency table of state adoption rates

m

!l.ln

?.no

am

fI�

IrJ.Q!l

n.oo

l:l.oo

13m

1.':.00

15.00 nJD

'if6;))"

I included this figure to again reaffIrm Volden's hypothesis that a watershed moment exists
where a policy will rapidly diffuse and gain national momentum causing late adopters, or "followers"
l95
such as Wisconsin, to adopt a specific policy.
was an explosion of diffusion that as of

2005-2009 appears to be that time period, as there

2013 has appeared to have completely

dissipated. Finally, it

can be inferred through this observation that the states that have not yet adopted (the majority of
them being in the south) will never do so given the current influencers both inside and around their
state.
CONCLUSION
My initial hypotheses for my two-step approach to policy diffusion were only partially
conHrmed. For simple policy adoption, having a larger percentage of people already covered by local
ordinances was statistically sigoiHcant, but that was only when coupled with several other distinct
variables. As mentioned above, placing the variable of historical smoker population percentages
completely skewed the results. On top of that, the sigoiHcance level was only

.049. If any other

southern state were to adopt a comprehensive AISB, I imagine that local pressure would no longer
become statistically sigoiHcant. I was also incorrect about having a multitude of underlying state

195 Volden 2006
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features affecting adoption. All of my other variables attempting to control for government
preference and capacity fell flat. I do know however (due to my Pearson's r correlation) that there is a
lot more going on with adoption of AISBs, as median income, being a southern state, and citizen
ideology all were significant at the

.01 level. Perhaps future researchers can construct more focused

regressions to figure out what I am missing and account for the lost variables.
My evaluation of statewide AISB adoption rates yielded similar contradictions with my
hypotheses and data. I was correct in my estimate that geographical proximity would play a key patt
in determining policy diffusion, but I expected a state sharing a direct border with an AISB state
would be more significant than regionalism percentage. The opposite actually occurred, with
regionalism having a significance rate of

.028 and sharing a direct border only being .71. Again it

appeared that state legislature makeup had no effect on policy diffusion at the state level. The only
other factor that was actually significant at the

.05 level was having a history of AISB

preemption,

which therefore likely threw off the municipality numbers because it was illegal for local governments
to have them. Based on my Pearson's r correlation between adoption rates and percentage of a state's
smoking population being

.632, I strongly expected that result to shine through in my OLS

regression. Seeing another lost variable, I ran another regression with just variables significant at the

.1 level and nothing carne back as statistically significant. This therefore reaffirmed Berry and Berry's
1990

conclusion that for policy diffusion to be analyzed, there needs to be a multitude of

independent variables. Comparing the two independent variables' results show that many different
forces are at play when polices diffuse, and ignoring a two-step procedure leaves out much of the
story.
According to my frequency chart, policy diffusion for statewide comprehensive anti-indoor
smoking bans appears to be at its end. Unfortunately for this study, federal influence on this policy
did not begin until September

2013,

with a national ad campaign from the Center for Disease

,,!96
Control (CDC) aimed at curbing tobacco usage called "Tips from Former Smokers.
The full
impact of this new federal initiative has not been recorded on states that do not have a
comprehensive AISB and it is likely that it might tip the scale toward adopting legislation. This
research can therefore be interpreted as the result of state and local government, as the diffusion is
appears to be largely completed. In the coming months when such federal spending can be coded,
future researchers can use this document to provide insight on how to explain policy diffusion.

196

Center for Disease Control and Prevention 2013
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